Into the firing line: civilian ingress during the 2013  Red October  bushfires, Australia by Wilkinson, Carrie et al.
University of Wollongong
Research Online
Faculty of Social Sciences - Papers Faculty of Social Sciences
2016
Into the firing line: civilian ingress during the 2013
"Red October" bushfires, Australia
Carrie Wilkinson
University of Wollongong, cw979@uowmail.edu.au
Christine Eriksen
University of Wollongong, ceriksen@uow.edu.au
Trent D. Penman
University of Wollongong, tpenman@uow.edu.au
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information contact the UOW Library:
research-pubs@uow.edu.au
Publication Details
Wilkinson, C., Eriksen, C. & Penman, T. D. (2016). Into the firing line: civilian ingress during the 2013 "Red October" bushfires,
Australia. Natural Hazards, 80 (1), 521-538.
Into the firing line: civilian ingress during the 2013 "Red October"
bushfires, Australia
Abstract
A major issue for bushfire management arises when residents decide to leave a safe area and enter the fire zone
to rescue or defend their property, pets, loved ones or other assets. Here, we use statistical and narrative
analyses of data from an online survey and semi-structured interviews with residents affected by the 2013
"Red October" bushfires in New South Wales, Australia. The survey results revealed that of the 58 % of
respondents who were not at home at the time the threat became apparent, 65 % indicated that they
attempted to get home prior to the arrival of the fire front. In doing so, many endangered themselves, their
family, friends and emergency services personnel. This paper discusses the shortcomings of bushfire survival
plans and official risk communication, which do not cater well for household units that are divided or
unattended when a bushfire starts. Findings suggest that to enhance bushfire safety and preparedness,
emergency managers should acknowledge and speak more directly to the specific constraints to action for
particular social groups at the wildland-urban interface, including families with school-age children,
commuters and absentee landholders.
Keywords
during, 2013, red, into, october, firing, bushfires, australia, line, civilian, ingress
Disciplines
Education | Social and Behavioral Sciences
Publication Details
Wilkinson, C., Eriksen, C. & Penman, T. D. (2016). Into the firing line: civilian ingress during the 2013 "Red
October" bushfires, Australia. Natural Hazards, 80 (1), 521-538.
This journal article is available at Research Online: http://ro.uow.edu.au/sspapers/2204
Page 1 of 28 
 
Into the Firing Line: Civilian Ingress during the 2013 ‘Red October’ Bushfires, Australia 
 
Abstract. A major issue for bushfire management arises when residents decide to leave a safe area and enter the 
fire zone to rescue or defend their property, pets, loved ones or other assets. Here we use statistical and narrative 
analyses of data from an online survey and semi-structured interviews with residents affected by the 2013 ‘Red 
October’ bushfires in New South Wales, Australia. The survey results revealed that of the 58% of respondents 
who were not at home at the time the threat became apparent, 65% indicated that they attempted to get home 
prior to the arrival of the fire front. In doing so, many endangered themselves, their family, friends and 
emergency services personnel. This paper discusses the shortcomings of bushfire survival plans and official risk 
communication, which do not cater well for household units that are divided or unattended when a bushfire 
starts. Findings suggest that to enhance bushfire safety and preparedness, emergency managers should 
acknowledge and speak more directly to the specific constraints to action for particular social groups at the 
wildland-urban interface, including families with school age children, commuters and absentee landholders. 
 
Key words bushfire, ingress/egress, interface communities, risk communication, household preparedness 
  
1 Introduction 1 
 2 
Bushfires (wildfires) are an integral and defining part of the history, ecology and culture of Australia. Residents 3 
in at-risk communities have historically been encouraged to be well-prepared in recognition that there are 4 
situations where fire authorities will be unable to provide timely and sufficient firefighting support to prevent 5 
losses to life and property (Whittaker et al., 2013; AFAC, 2012; Handmer and Tibbits, 2005). Disastrous 6 
bushfires are predicted to increase in frequency and intensity in the future (Liu et al., 2010; Bradstock et al., 7 
2009; Lucas et al., 2007).  8 
 9 
There is growing concern about the increasing numbers of dwellings in the wildland-urban interface (WUI) 10 
(McCaffrey et al., 2014; Mutch et al., 2010; Chen and McAneney, 2005). Communities at the WUI typically 11 
comprise a mix of residents attracted by favourable real estate prices, geographical location, infrastructure and 12 
high amenity values, which make it possible for city careers to be combined with ‘rural’ lifestyles (Wilkins et 13 
al., 2009). However, their lifestyles and environmental values can conflict with bushfire management. The daily 14 
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commute to work in the city, for example, prevents many residents from being at home during the day should a 15 
bushfire start. It also reduces the time available to carry out property maintenance (Eriksen and Gill, 2010).  16 
 17 
The expansion of the WUI and, with it, greater proportions of absentee landholders, isolated properties, and a 18 
commuting culture reliant on cars, presents both emergency managers and residents with a wicked problem1: 19 
what are the implications for individuals, households and emergency services when residents are not at home 20 
when a fire starts? This paper combines the results of an online survey and in-depth interviews with 21 
homeowners affected by the 2013 ‘Red October’ bushfires in New South Wales (NSW), Australia, to better 22 
understand residents’ decisions and actions when they, or other members of their household, were away from 23 
home when the fire threat became apparent. Specifically, this paper is concerned with a post-fire analysis of the 24 
factors participants indicated determined and influenced their decision to leave a safe area and enter the fire 25 
zone, and the outcomes of such actions.  26 
 27 
2 Bushfire safety: managing intentions and actions 28 
 29 
2.1 The policy context 30 
 31 
Residents in high fire danger areas of Australia have historically been encouraged to make a considered choice 32 
to either prepare to stay and defend their property or else prepare to leave early. This longstanding community 33 
safety policy position, known (until 2010) as the ‘Prepare, Stay and Defend, or Leave Early’ policy (PSDLE), 34 
drew credence from research into bushfire fatalities and house loss, which show that the likelihood of 35 
successfully defending a house is significantly greater when houses are well prepared and residents are able-36 
bodied and mentally prepared (Handmer and Tibbits, 2005; Lazarus and Elley, 1984; Wilson and Ferguson, 37 
1984). There is abundant evidence that evacuating late is dangerous (Krusel and Petris, 1999; Miller et al., 1984; 38 
McArthur and Cheney, 1967). Nearly one-third (32%) of bushfire-related fatalities between 1901 and 2008 39 
occurred as residents fled the fire, making it the most common activity at time of death (Haynes et al., 2010).  40 
 41 
The PSDLE policy was subject to critical review following the 2009 ‘Black Saturday’ bushfires in Victoria 42 
where 113 people perished in their homes (AAP, 2009a, 2009b). The ensuing Victorian Bushfires Royal 43 
                                                          
1 In public policy terms, a “wicked problem” is a problem that cannot clearly be defined or solved (APPC, 
2007). Trying to manage this problem may inadvertently create other problems. 
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Commission concluded that, with the exception of ‘catastrophic fire events’ where no property is considered 44 
defendable, the central tenets of PSDLE were theoretically sound but difficult to enforce in practice (Handmer et 45 
al., 2010; Teague et al., 2010). Notably, the Commission asserted that the PSDLE approach rested on an 46 
unrealistic assumption that all people would either immediately, and exclusively, ‘stay and defend’ or ‘leave’ 47 
the area early. The policy did not address the reality, supported by research prior to and following ‘Black 48 
Saturday’, that many people wait to see what will happen when a fire threatens before fully committing to a 49 
course of action (McLennan et al., 2013; Whittaker and Handmer, 2010; Reinholdt et al., 1999). Furthermore, 50 
whilst contingency planning was an element of the policy position, it did not translate well into official advice 51 
(McLennan and Handmer, 2012; Teague et al., 2010). The Commission’s recommendations led to a revised 52 
approach – ‘Prepare. Act. Survive.’ (PAS) – with similar core principles to the PSDLE policy but with greater 53 
emphasis on the importance of both physical and mental preparedness, and that leaving early is always the 54 
safest option (AFAC, 2012).   55 
 56 
2.2 Survival plans and official advice 57 
 58 
Fire authorities across Australia have devised Bushfire Survival Plan booklets and planning templates to assist 59 
residents in physically and mentally preparing themselves and their properties for a bushfire threat (Eriksen et 60 
al., Accepted). Their design embodies the precepts of PAS and, as such, readers are prompted to prepare for 61 
either defending a well prepared property, or for leaving early. Although there are prompts for contingency 62 
planning these documents are essentially based on the assumption that all residents will be at home when a fire 63 
starts. This ‘complete household’ as focus for risk communication was criticised following the ‘Black Saturday’ 64 
bushfires:   65 
 66 
Much attention and effort has been focused on developing policies and procedures to assist people who 67 
are in their homes in the event of a bushfire. However, less attention has been given to the needs of 68 
those who are not at home when bushfires threaten, including travellers, visitors and tourists, and those 69 
located at work, in hospitals or other health facilities, or in schools, kindergartens or child care centres. 70 
(Teague et al., 2009, p.206.)   71 
 72 
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Official crisis communication during bushfires (alerts, television and radio reportage, etc.) is explicit in 73 
instructing against “unnecessary travel” during bushfires. Yet, when exactly is travel “unnecessary” given that 74 
acceptable levels of “risk” differs between households, individuals and emergency services? Outside of advice 75 
concerning evacuation, only four references to advice against “travel” during bushfires were found in official 76 
preparedness literature. The NSW Rural Fire Service (RFS) (NSW RFS, 2013 p.4) advises developing a habit of 77 
paying attention to local radio and TV on hot, dry, windy days, to assist with daily planning to avoid areas with 78 
an increased risk of a bushfire. The South Australia (SA) Country Fire Service (CFS) (SA CFS, 2014b) advises 79 
that on severe (Total Fire Ban) days, people should, if possible, avoid travelling into bushfire prone areas. The 80 
Queensland (QLD) Fire and Emergency Service (FES), and West Australia (WA) Department of Fire and 81 
Emergency Services (DFES) provide the most contextual advice on travelling home during a bushfire. The QLD 82 
FES (2015 p.11), for example, prompts readers who plan on leaving early to consider and write down, what they 83 
will do if they have sent their children to school that day: “Think about whether or not you will have to travel 84 
from work into the fire zone”. In advising against travelling near a bushfire, the document also states “You 85 
should never take a journey into areas where the fire danger is catastrophic or extreme. You should consider 86 
postponing or finding alternative routes if necessary. If you can smell or see smoke in the distance, it is best to 87 
U-turn and drive away from the danger” (QLD FES, 2015 p.8). The WA DFES (2014a) informs readers that 88 
they may not be able to get home if away when a fire starts because of road closures. In the context of planning 89 
to stay and defend, readers are also prompted to consider and write down what they will do if “you cannot return 90 
to your home to actively defend your house (roads blocked)?” (WA DFES, 2014a p.38).  91 
 92 
In contrast to most official agency planning advice, Towers’ (2013) template for involving children in planning 93 
and preparation of family survival plans, is built on the assumption that a household will most likely be divided 94 
when a bushfire threat eventuates due to education and employment commitments. This is an important 95 
addition, as the limited identified travel-specific advice points to a dearth of official material to assist residents 96 
who are regularly absent from their properties, such as commuters, households with school age children, and 97 
‘weekenders’. The detailed material available to assist residents devise a plan to either ‘stay and defend’ or 98 
‘leave early’, means that residents who may be well-prepared for defending their property or for leaving early if 99 
at home when a fire breaks out, may be ill-prepared for the dangers of travelling towards the fire front to get 100 
home and implement these plans under intense stress and time-pressure. Only in the most recent round of 101 
updates by the SA CFS (2014a p.7), NSW RFS (2013 pp.16-17) and Australian Capital Territory (ACT) 102 
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Emergency Services Agency (ESA) (2013 pp.16-17) does official advice incorporate prompts to readers to 103 
consider school policies for emergency situations, such as bushfires, or if children are home alone. These 104 
revisions, however, do not advise against travel during a bushfire or provide advice on how to plan for these 105 
scenarios. 106 
 107 
2.3 Survival intentions and associated movement 108 
 109 
Civilian ingress during bushfires is a surprisingly under-researched topic. Though a large body of scholarship is 110 
concerned with better understanding residents’ survival related decisions under threat from an imminent, or 111 
potential, bushfire, research has mainly focused on the factors likely to determine at-home residents’ decisions 112 
to ‘stay and defend’, ‘leave early’ or ‘wait and see’ (McNeill et al., 2014; McLennan et al., 2013; Whittaker et 113 
al., 2010). This is despite evidence from studies of residents’ responses to an actual fire threat, which provide 114 
noteworthy exceptions to this general trend. For example, post-fire analyses of residents’ preparedness and 115 
actions during two bushfires in 2011 at the WUI of Perth, WA, found that a number of residents were not at 116 
home when the fires were initially reported (most were at work) and that the majority sought to return home 117 
once informed of the threat (Heath et al., 2011; McLennan et al., 2011). Similarly, a majority (83%) of study 118 
participants who were not at home when the fire threat became apparent in North Warrandyte, Victoria (VIC) in 119 
1991 attempted to return home (success rate of 62%) (Beringer, 2000). Data collected from multiple fire events 120 
by Reinholdt et al. (1999), similarly revealed that ‘return to rescue’ and ‘unsuccessful attempt to return’ were 121 
two of the main ways people responded to knowledge of a fire threat.  122 
 123 
Part of the problems is that questions relating to civilian ingress generally form only a small part of broader 124 
post-fire studies with analysis rarely going beyond reporting of simple statistics and trends. A few notable 125 
exceptions provide important insights to the motivating factors and implications of civilian ingress during 126 
bushfires.  127 
 128 
Focussing on the 2005 Wangary Bushfire, SA, Proudley (2010) explored what factors influenced decision-129 
making under threat within families. Interviews identified that the roles that people have within a family unit 130 
play a major part in what they do, how they behave and respond during a crisis. A significant number of women 131 
were found to be at home alone with infants on the day of the fire, and their heavy reliance on husbands and 132 
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partners for preparedness, planning and decision-making became a family burden. It not only placed pressure on 133 
the partner at home to make survival related decisions, but it also put pressure on the absent partner to return 134 
home to rescue or protect their family.  135 
 136 
Similarly, research with fire-affected households in both Australia and the USA revealed how egress “only 137 
portrays one side of the evacuation coin” (Eriksen, 2014 p.42). For many, getting home by travelling into the 138 
line of fire was an equally pressing issue, despite official orders to evacuate. Eriksen (2014) highlights how the 139 
need to care for children, elderly relatives, disabled people and other loved ones, including animals, instinctively 140 
guides the intended and actual actions of residents absent from home in the face of a bushfire threat. In 141 
attempting to get home during a fire, many people take risks, not only via daily commuting routes along narrow 142 
winding roads through forests or on mountain slopes but also by diverting to little-known back roads to reduce 143 
distance or dodge police blocks. Late evacuations are typically triggered by the appearance of flames or heavy 144 
smoke nearby (Whittaker et al., 2013), which heightens the risk of encountering dangers associated with a fire 145 
front, such as flames, ember attack, thick smoke, falling trees and rushing traffic (Haynes et al., 2010). 146 
However, the very same environmental cues can trigger instinctive urges to “get home”. The anxieties 147 
associated with a divided household and the dangers of travelling towards, or through, the fire front to collect 148 
children from school or home is explicitly highlighted in Towers’ (2013) focus on the wellbeing of children 149 
during bushfires. She highlights the possibility that schools will be closed on days of catastrophic fire danger 150 
and advises that if people are unable to take time off work, it is important to make advance care preparations for 151 
children. 152 
 153 
The experiences and decision-making of non-resident horse agistors2 during the 2003 Canberra bushfires, ACT, 154 
reveal that the, then current, PSDLE policy also did not cater for the needs of non-resident agistors (Main, 155 
2010). Many agistors left their residences in the comparably safer confines of Canberra’s urban areas and 156 
intentionally travelled towards (and through) the fire front to rescue their horses on properties at the WUI. Many 157 
agistors “rushed out to the paddocks too late and were stopped by roadblocks” (ibid, p.16). Main (2010 p.20) 158 
asserts bushfire safety information for horse owners “assumes horse owners are also property owners”. This is 159 
significant in the context of our study, as bushfire safety information more broadly assumes that the resident will 160 
be at home at the time the fire threat eventuates (discussed above).  161 
                                                          
2 An ‘agistor’ is a person who pays to keep their horse on someone else’s land (Main, 2010 p.2).   
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 162 
Although situated in broader discussions of bushfire vulnerability and resilience, the above studies’ critical 163 
engagement with civilian ingress illustrate that perceptions of ‘tolerable’ hazard and risk are complex, and 164 
influenced by socio-demographic, economic and lifestyle factors alike. In the context of risk and crisis 165 
communication, acknowledgement of this is crucial to inform and overcome disparity in perceived risk and 166 
consequent actions between, and within, various divisions of the emergency services and individual household 167 
members.  168 
 169 
2.4 Fatality statistics 170 
 171 
It is difficult to discern with certainty if recorded bushfire fatalities are the direct result of attempts to travel 172 
through the danger zone to get home. It is equally difficult to discern whether anyone has died whilst defending, 173 
leaving or sheltering after successfully entering the fire zone from a safe place. Few studies had specifically 174 
examined the circumstances surrounding fatalities, outside of formal coronial inquiry. Notable exceptions are 175 
Chambers and Bettingham (1967) and McArthur and Cheney (1967) who assessed civilian deaths during the 176 
1967 Hobart bushfires (see also Haynes et al., 2008), and Krusel and Petris (1999) who examined the 177 
circumstances of civilian fatalities during the 1983 Ash Wednesday Bushfire. More recently, studies of bushfire 178 
fatalities have drawn on longitudinal data sets, encompassing data from multiple fire events (Blanchi et al., 179 
2014; Haynes et al., 2010).  180 
 181 
Haynes et al. (2010) is the only study to explicitly identify fatalities caused by civilians attempting to ‘get 182 
home’. In analyzing the relationship between gender, age and activity at time of death, they distinguished when 183 
a “victim left a safe area and deliberately entered fire zone in order to defend or rescue property or loved ones” 184 
(p.187). Across the time period 1900 – 2008, 25 out of a total of 552 civilians were killed whilst “en route to 185 
defend or rescue” (18 male, 3 female, 4 <18 years of age) (p.190). They highlight that the higher number of 186 
fatalities “en route to defend or rescue” in the time period 1955 – 2008 (8 male, 3 female, 4 < 18 years of age), 187 
compared to ten casualties (all male) in 1900 – 1954, may be explained by the higher prevalence and use of cars 188 
since the 1950s. 189 
 190 
2.5 Vehicle Safety 191 
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 192 
It is well documented that cars do not provide as good protection as houses do from radiant heat during 193 
bushfires (Auditor General Victoria, 2003). Cars are the most likely mode of transport to be used by residents 194 
seeking to outrun a fire front. Twenty-six of the 53 people killed in the 1967 Hobart bushfires died in or near 195 
vehicles (Leonard, 2010). Sixteen of the thirty-two civilian fatalities in the 1983 Ash Wednesday fires were 196 
vehicle-related (Krusel and Petris, 1999). Eight of the nine fatalities in the 2005 Wangary Bushfire (aka the 197 
2005 Eyre Peninsula fire) perished in their vehicles (AFAC, 2008).  198 
 199 
Despite this historical evidence, there are discrepancies in the official discourse on vehicle safety during 200 
bushfires. The scholarship on vehicle tenability in bushfire burnover is concerned more with the tenability of 201 
firefighting appliances and crew safety, than with civilians (Knight et al., 2003; Mangan, 1997). Research 202 
conducted in 2006 dispelled the myth that sheltering in cars is the “second best option” in providing a buffer 203 
between people and radiant heat during a bushfire (Leonard, 2010 p.3). The Australasian Fire Authorities 204 
Council (AFAC, 2008) accordingly updated its Guidance for people in cars during bushfires to highlight that 205 
sheltering passively in vehicles can be extremely dangerous and needs to be avoided wherever possible. 206 
However, Handmer et al. (2010) concluded in their review of fatalities in the 2009 ‘Black Saturday’ bushfires, 207 
that the question of evacuation in cars warranted re-examination given that few people (7) died in cars during 208 
the fire.  209 
 210 
Regardless of such discrepancies, it is clear that driving even short distances during a bushfire can be extremely 211 
dangerous, as noted by Krusel and Petris (1999, p.7):  212 
 213 
Surviving witnesses mentioned the confusion, poor visibility, loss of orientation and conditions 214 
hazardous to driving that were present prior to the arrival of the fire. Evacuation was made even more 215 
difficult by the fact that people did not know where the fire was, and which roads provided access to 216 
safety. 217 
 218 
Such conditions are equally applicable to residents attempting to ‘get home’ by racing the fire front in their 219 
vehicles. Routes of ingress and egress easily become bottlenecks when the threat of bushfire looms, or when the 220 
movements of fast bushfires are difficult to track. In 1969 seventeen people perished on the highway between 221 
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Geelong and Melbourne, VIC, under such conditions. However, it is important to note that whereas those who 222 
perished in 1969 were not attempting to get home before the fire arrival (rather they were taken by surprise by 223 
the fast moving grass fire), those attempting to get home intentionally create a vulnerable situation where they 224 
can block or be trapped in traffic, or are unable to outrun flames encountered en route.  225 
 226 
3 Study Context and Methods 227 
 228 
In October 2013, approximately 100 bushfires burnt across eastern NSW, intensified by high temperatures and 229 
strong winds. The most damaging fire activity occurred on Thursday 17 October but the severe weather 230 
conditions meant the fires continued to threaten communities until Wednesday 23 October. The ‘Red October’ 231 
fires, as they came to be known, destroyed over 200 houses, with hundreds more damaged, in the Blue 232 
Mountains, Southern Highlands, Central Coast and Port Stephens areas. This paper reports on the results of a 233 
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Fig. 1. Map of study areas (black dots with names) and proximity to the footprint of the 2013 ‘Red October’ 238 
bushfires (areas shaded grey), NSW, Australia (map drawn by B. Horsey, 2014).  239 
 240 
The study was conducted across a number of study sites (Figure 1), using data collected through an online 241 
survey (Horsey and Penman, 2014) as well as semi-structured interviews (McLennan et al., 2014; Wilkinson et 242 
al., 2014). Basic characteristics of the survey and interview participants are outlined in Table 1. The online 243 
survey was created via Survey Monkey© and advertised through the email lists and social media of the NSW 244 
RFS, as well as social media of the authors and their institutional affiliations. Due to the infinite number of 245 
potential viewers of social media, it is not possible to determine a total response rate for the online survey. The 246 
online survey consisted of 108 questions that covered a range of topics, including previous bushfire experiences, 247 
household preparedness, actions before and during the fire, and information sourcing. This paper specifically 248 
draws on the survey questions that identify whether respondents were at home at the time the fire threat first 249 
became apparent, and their consequent actions, including whether they attempted to get home and if they were 250 
successful in their attempt (see Tables 2 and 3).    251 
 252 
Table 1: Characteristics of the survey and interview participants 253 
 Online Survey  Southern Highlands 
Post-Fire Interviews 
Blue Mountains Post-
Fire Interviews  
Localities  
Blue Mountains, Southern 
Highlands, Central Coast, Port 
Stephens 
Yanderra, Yerrinbool and 
Balmoral (‘Hall Road 
Fire’) 
Bilpin and Mount 
Wilson (‘State Mine 
Fire’) 
Number of interviews - 25 18 
Number of research 
participants 
589 
(212 male, 377 female) 
30 
(14 male, 16 female) 
23 
(14 male, 9 female) 
Number not at home 287 11 10 
Number who 
attempted to returned 
home 
185 9 9 
 254 
The long duration of the ‘Red October’ bushfires, and the fact that some communities were on alert for several 255 
weeks before they were affected, meant that many residents ‘came and went’, for work and lifestyle reasons, a 256 
number of times before the fire posed a threat to their properties. The design of the online survey made it 257 
difficult to capture respondents’ movements across the multiple days of the event. To give greater validity to the 258 
conclusions drawn from the online survey, we triangulated the survey results with narratives documented in 259 
semi-structured interviews with residents affected by the bushfires in the Southern Highlands (McLennan et al., 260 
2014) and Blue Mountains regions (Wilkinson et al., 2014).  261 
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 262 
A total of 589 complete surveys were returned between December 2013 and February 2014. The majority of 263 
these came from residents affected by the Links View (n = 254), Hall Road (n = 154), Mount York (n = 60) and 264 
State Mine (n = 51) fires in the Blue Mountains and Southern Highlands regions. Fewer surveys were completed 265 
by residents affected by fires on the Central and North Coasts (n = 70 total). Pearson’s Chi-Squared test of 266 
contingencies was used to evaluate the statistical significance of survey components. All analyses were 267 
conducted using the ‘R’ statistical package software. Women more commonly responded to the survey (64%) 268 
and the majority of all respondents were between 35 and 54 years of age (52%).  269 
 270 
The semi-structured interviews aimed to elicit in-depth narratives of residents’ direct experience of the 271 
bushfires. In December 2013, residents of five communities were interviewed on their properties. The study 272 
areas were chosen due to their proximity to the recent bushfires: Yanderra, Yerrinbool and Balmoral in the 273 
Southern Highlands, affected by the Hall Road Fire, and Mt Wilson and Bilpin in the Blue Mountains, affected 274 
by the State Mine Fire (Figure 1). In the communities of Yanderra, Yerrinbool and Balmoral interviewees were 275 
selected via door knocking along streets delineating the WUI located in closest proximity to the fire. 276 
Participation was voluntary as well as dependent on residents being at home at the time of the door knock. In the 277 
communities of Mt Wilson and Bilpin, interviewees were purposefully selected based on their participation in 278 
research that had been conducted with residents in both locales during May-June 2013 as part of a broader 279 
project examining risk and amenity (Gill et al., 2015). No further attempts were made to recruit further 280 
participants in any of the study areas due to budgetary and time constraints. With the participants’ permission, 281 
all of the interviews were audio-recorded and later transcribed verbatim.  282 
 283 
Given the survey advertising and interview recruitment methods, both samples are potentially biased towards 284 
people with direct personal bushfire experience and/or already interested in fire management to some extent. 285 
Therefore, the data does not represent a completely randomised sample, and represents a more optimistic 286 
scenario for the extent of planning. The qualitative interview data were subjected to systematic coding and 287 
analysis in QSR NVivo 10.0, a computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software program. An iterative 288 
process of identifying appropriate codes was followed to capture a priori and emergent themes. The interview 289 
quotes used in this paper are verbatim and have been chosen because they reflect attitudes, beliefs and concerns 290 
shared by the participants in this study.  291 
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 292 
4 Research Findings and Discussion 293 
 294 
4.1 Racing the fire front    295 
 296 
More than half (58%) of survey respondents were not at home at the time the fire threat became apparent (Table 297 
2). This corresponds with broader societal trends, with a growing number of Australians choosing to combine 298 
city careers with rural lifestyles at the WUI since the 1960s (Wilkins et al., 2009). Improvement in road systems 299 
has furthermore contributed to Australia becoming a nation reliant on cars (ABS, 2013). Employees are now 300 
commuting for longer, in traffic that is more congested, to reach their place of work (Flood and Barabato, 2005). 301 
More women (46%) than men (35%) were at home when the fire threat eventuated3 (see also Haynes et al., 302 
2010), which is consistent with Flood and Barabato’s (2005) observation that, on average, men spend more time 303 
travelling to and from work each week than women.  304 
 305 
Table 2: Comparison of civilian ingress during the ‘Red October’ bushfires, by gender4  306 
 
Were you at home when the 
fire threat became 
apparent? 



















Men 35% 65% 172 58% 42% 112 89% 11% 64 
Women 46% 54% 324 69% 31% 173 75% 25% 118 
Total 42% 58% 496 65% 35% 285 80% 20% 184 
 307 
Of the 58% (n = 288) of survey respondents who stated that they were not at home at the time the threat became 308 
apparent, 64% (n = 185) indicated that they attempted to get home prior to the arrival of the fire front. Almost 309 
eighty percent (n = 147) of these attempts were successful5. As reflected in the interview quote below, 310 
landholders expressed an array of expectations of the ease with which they would be able to get home in time: 311 
 312 
I was in Melbourne when you had the really bad weather here and things took off, but I had a couple of 313 
days.  And then I had a day to prepare once I got back just to make sure everything was right… [My 314 
                                                          
3 X-squared = 5.5359, df = 1, p-value = 0.01863 
4 More women than men were home at the time (p-value = 0.01863); women were marginally more likely to try and get 
home compared with men (p-value = 0.06723); men were more successful at getting home than women were (p-value = 
0.04436). 
5 The discrepancy between reported n values in the text vs. Table 2 is due to some respondents not answering all survey 
questions. 
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wife] didn’t do anything, because, well first of all it’s my job, and secondly it wasn’t about to, you 315 
know, consume her and the house.  It was some distance away; you could see it over there on the ridge 316 
so we knew we had some time. (Works locally, male, Bilpin, State Mine Fire)  317 
 318 
Fires can ignite, move and impact upon property rapidly leaving residents with little or no time for adequate 319 
preparation (Penman et al., 2013). Many study participants did not appear to question the distance from which 320 
they, or other members of their household, worked or studied, and the time it would take them to cover this 321 
distance to get home in the event of a fire. Indeed, there was an expectation expressed by many interview 322 
participants that they would be able to get home before the fire affected property:   323 
 324 
I just didn’t anticipate the roads to be blocked so early. I thought I’d have a reasonable opportunity to 325 
get back and help her [my wife] with things. But yeah, the fire moved in so quickly that [it] sort of took 326 
everyone by surprise a bit… The expectation was that I would get back in time. That I could help her 327 
move everything out and yes, we’re probably cutting it fine but the fire just beat us, it moved in too 328 
quick. It was pretty hopeless. (Commuter, male, Yanderra, Hall Road Fire) 329 
 330 
I work over at North Sydney so I was just buried in traffic for hours, I wasn’t getting back any time 331 
soon…. It takes me an hour and a half even if the roads are good to get back. And by the time I’d 332 
gotten to Campbelltown, the traffic was already starting to bank up. (Commuter, male, Yanderra, Hall 333 
Road Fire)     334 
 335 
The majority of interviewees reported being “surprised” by the speed of the fast moving fire. Several were also 336 
“surprised” by the extent and seemingly early set up of road blocks preventing access to threatened areas. Table 337 
3 examines the relationship between the time taken to get home, and the time between first learning of the fire 338 
and actual impact.  339 
 340 
Table 3: Comparison of time between first knowledge of the fire, actual impact, and travel time to return home.  341 
                                                          
6 Eight responses (of the 185 respondents who indicated that they attempted to get home once they found out about the fire) 
were removed from this analysis, as they did not answer both follow up questions.  
 (n = 177)6 How long after you first learnt of the fire did it threaten your home or the area close to your home? 
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 342 
Analysis of survey respondents who reported that the fire threatened their homes within one hour of first 343 
learning of the threat (n = 66), reveals that several travelled through potentially dangerous environments. Forty-344 
six percent (n = 30) successfully returned home within that first hour. Most then had less than 60 minutes to 345 
activate their survival plan. As indicated in the interviews, for some residents this involved rescuing loved ones 346 
and assets and leaving the area under threat (see Sections 4.2 – 4.5).  347 
 348 
4.2 Roadblocks and rationales for travel 349 
 350 
Twenty percent of survey respondents reported that they were unsuccessful in their attempts to get home after 351 
learning of the bushfire threat. The interviews provide greater insight into these difficulties with several 352 
participants encountering roadblocks on route, which they described as adding an additional level of anxiety and 353 
distress. The roadblocks (more so than the fire) were (in their opinion) what separated them from their family 354 
and prevented them from assisting with last minute preparations, rescuing pets or livestock, or actively 355 
defending their home. In attempts to bypass the road-blocks many interviewees described travelling on 356 
unofficial back roads to get home. These roadblocks had been put in place by authorities to keep people out of 357 
the fire zone – an area considered dangerous because of the active and unpredictable movement of the fire front:  358 
 359 
[Female participant]: We’ve got a business in Lithgow, where the fire started, which was interesting. 360 
On that day [our daughter] was also working and we were both in Lithgow. The fire had started there 361 
the day before, so we knew about it but we wouldn’t have gone to Lithgow that day if we’d realised 362 
how quickly that was going to change everything. I tried to get out the back way and couldn’t get 363 
through, couldn’t get out of Lithgow. Because I had to get back to get [our daughter from work]… So 364 
then I had to go the long way around and I drove through Winmalee, only about ten minutes before the 365 
fire started there. [My husband] rang me and said he got through Little Hartley. 366 
How long did it take you to 
get home? < 15 mins 15 – 30 mins 30 – 60 mins 1 – 2 hours > 2 hours 
Unsuccessful 35% 38% 28% 17% 10% 
< 15 mins 18% 24% 11% 8% 9% 
15 – 30 mins 12% 5% 11% 17% 18% 
30 – 60 mins 12% 19% 25% 17% 21% 
1 – 2 hours 12% 9% 14% 21% 21% 
> 2 hours 12% 5% 11% 21% 21% 
Total (n)  17 21 28 24 87 
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[Male participant]: We’ve being going up and down there for 22 years. I know all the little hidey holes 367 
so we got through. (Commuters, Bilpin, State Mine Fire) 368 
 369 
The heightened anxiety felt when separated from their family and pets prompted many to drive into the fire 370 
zone, despite official advice to the contrary. Such narratives provide insight into rationales for travel during the 371 
heat of the moment when what would ordinarily be perceived as an unacceptably hazardous action is 372 
outweighed by the urge to protect others:  373 
 374 
My wife and the two boys were all here apart from me, I was still at work… My wife was here because 375 
she was crook and it was just dumb luck she was actually at home because the boys normally come 376 
home and unlock the house themselves, so there’s nobody here until about five o’clock at least. It was 377 
just luck that there was somebody here, that [my wife] could pack up some stuff and organise the kids 378 
and liaise with the police and so on to get things done. Otherwise I’m concerned about how it would 379 
have unfolded. Because they blocked off the roads very, very early so we didn’t have a chance to get 380 
back and no matter how much you spoke to the police about the fact that, “Look, I need to get back 381 
there, I don’t intend on staying, I just need to get back because the kids are here.” (Commuter, male, 382 
Yanderra, Hall Road Fire) 383 
 384 
[My wife] didn’t want to go at all… over the whole 8 days she left and came back probably three times. 385 
So three separate nights, and yeah, so we pushed it to the limit. So the kids were here too, but on those 386 
three days they had to go, so they all went… We just judged the risk on the day. (Stay-at-home dad, 387 
Bilpin, State Mine Fire)  388 
 389 
Although the resident in the latter quote was at home when the fire threat became apparent, his narrative is 390 
representative of a number of interview participants, particularly those with young children or pets, who 391 
reported multiple accounts of ingress and egress prior to the dissipation of the fire threat. In this particular case, 392 
the anxiety of family separation resulted in multiple accounts of the wife and children evacuating and returning 393 
to the house. This again demonstrates the crucial role children play in the decision-making of households 394 
members separated during bushfires (Towers, 2013).     395 
  396 
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4.3 “Preparation” vs. “Response” 397 
 398 
The adaptive capacity of households relies heavily upon residents having an appreciation of the potential risks 399 
embedded within extreme weather warnings, as well as the foresight and ability to act upon such warnings in the 400 
days, weeks and months prior to a bushfire. The 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission (Teague et al., 401 
2010) found that despite widespread public warning that high temperatures and winds would likely create 402 
catastrophic fire conditions on 7 February 2009, many people living in bushfire prone areas had no grasp of the 403 
implications such severe weather conditions could have on the fire threat. Prior to the events of October 2013, 404 
many of the residents we surveyed and interviewed had taken considerable measures to actively prepare 405 
themselves and their property for bushfire but in the majority of cases, pivotal preventative action was not taken 406 
until the fire threat was imminent. This is consistent with research more broadly, which shows that even when 407 
residents have several days warning of a potential fire threat, many wait until there is an actual and immediate 408 
threat before taking action (Tibbits and Whittaker, 2007). By then, time is insufficient to adequately prepare the 409 
property and oneself physically and mentally for the task at hand (Penman et al., 2013).  410 
 411 
I just started to prepare the house as best I could. Got up, cleaned the gutters, and put some water in the 412 
gutters and stuff like that. Luckily, the power had come back on momentarily, which allowed me to get 413 
the hose going and water and stuff. (Works locally, male, Balmoral, Hall Road Fire)  414 
 415 
 By the time the fires came I had about four inches of water in the bottom of our dam, it was completely 416 
empty. (Works locally, male, Bilpin, State Mine Fire)     417 
 418 
 We’d been overseas and had been here very little in the previous three months and so all of the winter 419 
leaves left over from autumn, all the kindling that had fallen around the shed and around the water 420 
tanks. I mean, there’s mess still here that I never got down to clean up. So I had a mad day just working 421 
so hard to try to get all of the stuff ready. (Retiree, male, Mt Wilson, State Mine Fire)  422 
 423 
Several interview participants on town water had not envisaged or planned for power outages and did not have a 424 
generator or back-up water supply. Others with independent water supplies did not have sufficient reserves (in 425 
their opinion) to defend their property. Furthermore, whilst it was important for many  study respondents to get 426 
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home - especially those who had pre-arranged firefighting mechanisms in place to protect their homes - some 427 
explicitly expressed that they felt it was essential they be there to make ‘last-minute-tune-ups’ to the property. It 428 
was envisaged that these “preparations” would precede active defence:  429 
 430 
The thing that I’d say that was fortunate was the coincidence that I happened to be here and was able to 431 
implement all of those correction methods, prevention methods. (Retiree, male, Mt Wilson, State Mine 432 
Fire)  433 
 434 
I think we were pretty well set up. I did have to clean out a wasps nest out of my tickers, you know, the 435 
sprinklers? I’ve got two boom sprays towards half the backyard. There were wasps’ nests in them. And 436 
I had to make sure the pumps all worked. (Commuter, male, Bilpin, State Mine Fire) 437 
 438 
Even those who planned on leaving early did not adequately prepare to do so. Many had not considered what 439 
they would pack or what they would do if they were not at home at the time of the fire to grab packed 440 
belongings:  441 
 442 
We both got the notification on our phones when we were at work. I rushed home. My first instincts 443 
were to take care of the animals and put them in the car, and then pack up all our important things like 444 
our certificates and passports and things that we couldn’t replace that well.  By that time I had been 445 
packing up for about an hour. (Commuter, female, Balmoral, Hall Road Fire) 446 
 447 
The consistent reference by interview participants to the importance of being able to get home to implement 448 
modifications to the house and grounds (including packing to leave again) reflects the practical aspects of 449 
preparedness emphasised in risk communication (such as checklists). However, it is important to note that these 450 
actions were actually responses triggered by the immanency of the fire threat. This confusion over what being 451 
“well prepared” for bushfire means on paper and in practice has become a recognized public policy issue. In the 452 
wake of the 2009 ‘Black Saturday’ bushfires, for example, Handmer et al. (2010) found that many of the people 453 
killed were undertaking “response” actions rather than “preparations” prior to impact of the fire. To reduce the 454 
number of lives and houses lost during bushfires Eriksen and Prior (2013) and Penman et al. (2013) emphasise 455 
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the need for risk communication to clearly define and explain why practical household preparation tasks need to 456 
be completed on a regular basis.  457 
 458 
4.4 Leaving work: the consent of employers 459 
 460 
Several interview participants described seeking permission from their employers before leaving work on the 461 
day of the fire. For some, the pressure of ensuring their manager was informed of their decision to leave work, 462 
and that this action was justified, caused delays: 463 
 464 
I was at work and basically had to go up to my boss and say, “Look, I’ve got a message, there’s fires in 465 
our area so I’ve got to go”, and lucky enough what I was working on at work wasn’t critical to be done 466 
that day. So that was my first instinct, “Oh, can I leave my work? Are other people dependent on what 467 
I’m doing?” (Commuter, female, Balmoral, Hall Road Fire)   468 
 469 
Such incidences amongst commuters who worked in the city raises the question: what role should employers 470 
play in preparing their employees for bushfire? Whilst the SA Country Fire Service (SA CFS, n.d.) and VIC 471 
Country Fire Authority (VIC CFA, 2014) distribute detailed information kits pertaining to bushfire safety and 472 
preparedness for businesses, for the most part, these documents do not look at preparing employees for bushfire 473 
beyond the workplace. Employers could play an active role in promoting bushfire safety education specific to 474 
the needs of commuting employees. This would also ensure that a conversation has taken place between the 475 
employer and employee with regards to the company’s policy on leaving work to attend to a bushfire and 476 
employees knowing their rights to do so (or not). 477 
 478 
4.5 Caring for pets via neighbourhood networks 479 
 480 
Several interview participants described anxieties relating to pets as a motivating factor for getting home. In 481 
their absence, many friends and neighbours attempted to rescue and defend pets and livestock, some by leaving 482 
a safe area: 483 
 484 
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The neighbours were actually the ones that got my horses out. You know, I was stuck trying to get home. 485 
And they got the horses out to another friend’s property. (Commuter, female, Yanderra, Hall Road Fire) 486 
 487 
We rushed back. Everyone was gathered outside the fire station. There were fireys [sic. firefighters] 488 
everywhere. I was in a panic ‘cause the neighbours were crying because they said, “We tried to get [your 489 
dog] but you were out”. And I said, “Yes, but I always leave the door open just in case”. I do. On a day like 490 
that, I would leave the door open, but they didn’t know and they hadn’t tried the door so that’s when the 491 
neighbours said, “Come on, we’ll go and get him”. I said, “No, I’m going to run down and get him. I don’t 492 
want you going in your car.” She said, “You can’t run down”. Anyway, we came to the top of the road… 493 
and the fireys let us through. I was quite surprised. I just said, “My dog’s down there”. He said, “Go straight 494 
there, get him, come straight back.” That’s what I did and then we all sat or stood and watched the fire go 495 
through. (Retiree, female, Balmoral, Hall Road Fire) 496 
 497 
These narratives bring to light the benefits of communicating with neighbours prior to a fire breaking out. 498 
Although no physical harm came to the people and pets involved in the above example, had neighbours known 499 
that the back door was left open in the event of extreme fire weather, they may have been able to rescue her dog 500 
as they evacuated the area, averting the need to return to the fire threat. This provides another example as to why 501 
risk communication needs to clearly explain the importance of preparing a bushfire survival plan that involves 502 
and has been discussed with family, friends, and neighbours alike in case of contingency planning.  503 
 504 
5 Conclusion 505 
 506 
Though official advice is explicit in instructing against “unnecessary travel” during bushfires, to date there has 507 
been no consistent advice on how to adequately prepare for and cope with the known issue of residents, who are 508 
not at home when a bushfire starts, leaving a safe area and entering the fire zone to rescue or defend property, 509 
pets and loved ones. What constitutes a “tolerable” hazard and risk, and to whom, is a grey area of bushfire 510 
resilience literature. While it is widely agreed that physically and mentally prepared people can defend well-511 
prepared houses in less than catastrophic conditions if they are at home to implement their survival plan, much 512 
less focus has been placed on the matter of residents placing themselves and others in danger in order to return 513 
to their property upon learning of an imminent threat.  514 
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 515 
One reason for prompting debate on this matter is the emphasis in this paper on the infeasibility of travelling 516 
under threat through the vegetated terrain that often defines WUI landscapes. This problem is exacerbated with 517 
the high level of residents who commute on a daily basis to the city, thus attempting to return via limited and 518 
congested routes, which are simultaneously relied upon by emergency vehicles and evacuating residents 519 
travelling at speed. Fast-moving bushfires furthermore decrease the likelihood of anyone having sufficient time 520 
to return home or find a structure suitable for shelter en route. History has shown that most bushfire fatalities are 521 
the result of people being caught out while travelling either on foot or in vehicles (Haynes et al., 2010). Several 522 
studies have documented the dangers associated with late evacuation (as referenced in Sections 2.3 and 2.4), 523 
reinforcing the importance of clearly communicating about how to plan for timely evacuation. Far less emphasis 524 
has been placed on the similar dangers involved in “getting home” during a bushfire, in part because official 525 
advice against entering a fire zone leaves little room for debate about the alternatives that residents resort to. 526 
Yet, as this study and other research have repeatedly shown, a significant proportion of WUI residents attempt 527 
to return home upon learning of a bushfire threatening their home and/or family. To simply ban residents from 528 
returning home during a bushfire with roadblocks or mandatory evacuation orders is therefore a simplistic and 529 
short-sighted solution to an overtly complex and ongoing issue. It highlights the need for further research that 530 
compares different types of communities, residents’ planned action with their actual movements during a 531 
bushfire threat, and their rationales for or against travel in or out of a fire zone. 532 
 533 
Effectively translating the ‘Prepare. Act. Survive.’ policy into practice therefore remains a challenging work in 534 
progress. There is room for improvement in terms of official documents and planning templates accommodating 535 
the increasingly common occurrence of residents being away from home when the fire threat eventuates. 536 
Bushfire safety advice needs to be more detailed and flexible to assist residents with diverse backgrounds and 537 
lifestyles, including parents, commuters, and absentee landholders, to make informed decisions of the likely 538 
benefits and costs associated with attempting to get home in uncertain and dangerous conditions. The wicked 539 
problem of civilian ingress during bushfires requires innovative solutions that can be successfully worked across 540 
agencies and residents if the risk of people entering the fire zone unprepared is to be avoided. For example, 541 
packing a box with vital belongings (documents, photos, medication, clothes) and taking it to work on 542 
catastrophic and extreme fire danger days could be a standard part of commuting through bushfire-prone 543 
landscapes. Employers could play an active role in promoting bushfire safety education specific to the needs of 544 
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commuting employees. Creating contingency plans for children, the elderly, people with disabilities, and pets 545 
that involves neighbours, schools, employers, family or friends, could ensure that alternatives to travelling 546 
towards, or through a fire front, have been considered and agreed upon before the threat eventuates. 547 
 548 
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